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Data is the lifeblood of many organizations.
Compared to the centralized mechanisms of data
sharing (and the subsequent reuse and repurposing),
many, if not all, aspects of these processes can be
decentralized by using blockchain and provenance
semantics. By capturing metadata details at each step
of the workflow, data will be easier to audit, verify,
and merge with related datasets. It is common in
settings where data is either sensitive or valuable (or
both) to have formal data use agreements or sometimes
less formal rules for reuse, which we have captured
in smart contracts. A key innovative aspect of this
work is the departure from the traditional natural
language-based data use agreements with the aim of
making these agreements more computable, resulting in
enhanced usability by a broader community. We have
also engineered an innovative incentive mechanism for
sharing data using an ERC20 token, a popular technical
standard for developing fungible tokens on the Ethereum
blockchain. The system we developed can be used
to track data reuse, thus providing metrics for use
in measuring data producers’ impact for enterprise
reward structures and research measures such as an
h-index. As an example application, we discuss how this
approach could radically improve the quality and the
efficiency of scientific output in the setting of research
data sharing. We address the challenge of the costly
and time-consuming effort needed to bring an innovative
idea from the bench (basic research) to the bedside
(clinical level).
1. Introduction
According to Gartner, by 2023, organizations that
promote data sharing will outperform their peers
on most business value metrics [1]. Experimental
approaches that generate data are used in a wide range of
settings, from traditional academic science to industrial
research, to bring forth innovations from an idea to a
consumable product. In fact, data sharing has been
recast as a business necessity, with a shift in the mindset
from “don’t share data unless” to “must share data
unless” [2]. Also, as exemplified in this paper, the basis
of experimental science as practiced has vital elements,
such as studying previous discoveries, coming up with
a novel idea, developing a methodology, collecting
data, interpreting findings, reviewing peer-reviewed
reporting, disseminating research results and data, and
incorporating the results into a consumable product.
Much of the time spent is critical to test hypotheses and
verify outcomes. In some estimates, this process can
take as long as 17 years [3]. One vital area that is ripe
for significant improvement is research data sharing in
experimental sciences. We propose using blockchain
technologies that provide a platform to verify data and
results in a transparent and accountable manner, which
could speed up scientific endeavors. The faster the data
is shared between the various stakeholders, the more
impact the data can have in enabling and accelerating
innovation, thus positively impacting society. In fact,
since many researchers spend significant time and effort
on curating the data, it has been said that they would
rather share a toothbrush than data [4]. However,
this may change with a better system of trust and
accountability.
Our goal in this research is to create a transparent
and accountable methodology for sharing data with
robust incentives for all the stakeholders involved.
To exemplify this goal, we implement a data-sharing
application in the context of research data sharing that
captures the data life cycle with smart contracts. Such
a Decentralized Application (DApp) for research data
sharing will enable two or more researchers who have
not built up a trust relationship to reuse each other’s data
in a trustworthy and accountable manner. The critical
challenge to pursue this objective is not only enabling
the integration of the data spanning heterogeneous
data sources and formats but also discovering the
data in a decentralized setting and the sustainability
of the whole data ecosystem through novel incentive





mechanisms. We have designed and implemented a
DApp for scientific data sharing as a proof of concept
in achieving this ambitious goal.
2. Background
Even though “enterprise blockchain” systems have
blossomed in many industry sectors, we have not
seen the same level of activity and enthusiasm in
using blockchain systems in an area that requires a
tremendous amount of transparent, accountable, and
global coordination when solving scientific challenges
as exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same
time, enterprise blockchain systems immensely benefit
from leveraging experimental data, as that greatly
streamlines many of the processes that typically take
years to implement. Although we have used research
data sharing as an exemplar use case, the lessons learned
are equally applicable to many other domains, including
business use cases implementing enterprise blockchains.
Furthermore, this process can work equally well for
data within an organizational consortium managed
by a private permissioned enterprise blockchain or
a public permissionless blockchain. This section
provides the motivation and the background for our
work, highlighting both the old and new challenges
in science regarding data sharing in academic and
industrial research.
The transition process of research data from
bench-to-bedside can be compared to supply chain
management systems [5]. The specific steps in the
bench-to-bedside process as shown in Figure 1 includes
many data-related activities. The standard process first
involves a researcher having an idea for developing a
hypothesis and designing a study. The study is then
executed, and the raw material (data) is gathered and
stored. It undergoes initial prep (standardization) and
advanced processing (analysis). Advanced products
(results) are further processed and shipped to suppliers
and end-users (peer-reviewed publications). The
management and the retrieval of that data are often
challenging, and it is often an extra burden for the
data quality. Many existing approaches begin with a
centralized repository, but if the data are not integrated at
a semantic level, access to that data remains challenging,
and also, there are no capabilities for semantic search.
Due to that, the exploitation of the data remains low.
Similar to unpublished research, if the data in shared
research is not made available in some accessible format
(e.g., available in a data repository with the appropriate
access control), the data is likely to be lost over time [6].
There may be valid reasons for not making the data
available, such as for protecting individual privacy with
medical or survey data, threats from over-exploitation
of species or resources, national security concerns, or
matters subject to legal action. However, in cases
where the data is not subject to such restrictions or
can be handled with access control, if the sharing
of data does not transpire within 12 months, then
the likelihood of the data publication decreases with
time [7], and it may benefit the data creator to publish
the data to get credit for their work and to support
enhanced data reuse. We believe that the successful
deployment of a research data sharing DApp will reduce
repetitive work in collecting and reproducing scientific
data, as the data would have already been provided in a
provenance-aware accountable way. Such a mechanism
will enable researchers and their institutions to receive
credit for high-quality research data and methods even
before publishing and sharing their research under
the traditional peer-review process while reducing the
number of errors in the scientific literature as the
researchers would vet the data thoroughly as they would
now be more accountable for their research products.
Furthermore, intellectual property issues
and confidentiality are cited as the top reasons
researchers [8] and enterprises [9] did not share their
data. In particular, researchers in less privileged
countries may be afraid of getting scooped by more
resource-rich institutions [10]. Furthermore, researchers
with more insightful perspectives on interpreting data
may use others’ data to their advantage [11]. One of the
most famous cases of a scientist being disadvantaged
in this way is the story of Rosalind Franklin and
Nobel Prize winners Watson and Crick, who were all
among several labs working to identify DNA structure.
“Franklin had been working on the DNA model
question using X-ray crystallography to determine
the structure. Just a few months before Watson and
Crick’s landmark paper, Franklin came tantalizingly
close to discovering the correct model, but she did not
recognize it in the photographs she took. Frustrated
with the attitude of her college toward women, Franklin
was preparing to leave King’s College when fellow
scientist Maurice Wilkins, a close friend of Crick,
showed Watson a critical photograph.” [11] Watson and
Crick assessed the double helix structure and published
this finding that they may have never reached on their
own. Watson and Crick won the Nobel Prize. Franklin
got no recognition for her contribution to the discovery
because the data sharing was not done ethically. A
blockchain-based solution could capture all the stages
of the data preparation and the fair and just use of the
data through expressive, autonomous, and sustainable
data sharing policies encoded in data sharing smart
contracts that will avoid such issues.
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Figure 1. The progression of research in a typical scientific research project. This research focuses on the peer
verification of the research data, and the standardized data reuse and repurposing aspects.
When requesting access to data, most often, people
are required to have project-specific applications, and
approvals. This process can take months to years,
effectively excluding many reuse opportunities. For
example, the UK-based Biobank’s approval process can
take several months [12], and this was stated as one
of the better examples. Furthermore, researchers rarely
consider the possibility of someone unknown to them
working with the data, 20 or 50 years later, to correctly
interpret the results and derive correct conclusions from
the data. Therefore, it is beneficial to the community if
the research data were published to facilitate integration
with other data and for both intended and unintended
reuse into the foreseeable future. Just as it is vital
in scientific communication to be clear and precise
when writing papers, it is also crucial to communicate
effectively about data and their context. However, the
quasi-release of data by attaching conditions to their
use as it is currently done in centralized repositories is
unnecessarily cumbersome that presents a disincentive
to others to explore their potential, and these conditions
are often impractical to enforce.
There are currently many diverse data sharing
policies instituted by journals [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
and funding agencies [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. These
policies are a significant first step towards getting
scientific research data shared, but they are insufficient
to achieve reliable preservation and subsequent reuse of
data [23]. Some journals choose to archive data in their
online supplemental materials, but they are typically
not curated in a standard way. There is also URL
decay in the datasets provided [24] or often unclear
protocols on how to share the data [25]. Authors’ lack of
responsiveness to data requests has led to many journal
editors reporting draining experiences dealing with
authors who submitted papers under clear data-sharing
policies but who subsequently refused to share those
data when contacted by other researchers [26]. There
is also a change in the perceived willingness to share
data over time [27]. Shared research datasets through
interoperable protocols enable more transparent science,
with better error checking and verification of results.
3. Related Work
A theoretical model of data sharing shows how,
starting with a certain population participating, different
parameters surrounding sharing cost and incentive cost
affect whether more people choose to participate or stop
participating [28]. The authors conclude that if sharing
and participation costs are too high, participation
will not continue no matter how many people are
participating in the beginning. With positive sharing
and participating costs, participation will continue if the
beginning population of participants is over a certain
threshold. The most important condition has a negative
participation cost, meaning the user is being provided an
incentive. In this model, full participation happens no
matter the beginning population of participants. A more
practical application is described in COEUS [29] as a
“semantic web in-a-box” tool developed for research
applications capable of simplifying and speeding
development of semantic web applications as well as
providing an ontology that had terms related to scientific
research. It has been applied as a framework for
connecting rare disease registries in different locations
and formats [30].
There are several blockchain-based DApps for
research data sharing in medical research described in
the literature. For example, the motivations, advantages,
Page 7414
and limitations, as well as barriers and future challenges
faced when applying blockchain technology for sharing
data for medical research with a special focus on
oncology, are discussed in [31]. The authors have
indicated that while there are several existing prototypes
of blockchain-based healthcare systems, there is a lack
of implementation and evaluation in real-world settings
due to the existing barriers of the adoption (e.g., legal,
social, and technological limitations).
A blockchain-based pilot study called the Cancer
Gene Trust (CGT) was developed for the dissemination
of de-identified clinical and genomic data with a focus
on late-stage cancer [32]. The CGT addresses the
problem of researchers’ reluctance to share data to
preserve patient privacy, which unfortunately results in
little to no learning from real-world data. However, the
CGT does not address a scalable incentive mechanism
for the stakeholders involved.
A mobile DApp that allows a research study
participants to share useful features of their location
data derived from geo-coordinates, with a third party
research team, without revealing their raw coordinates
is described in [33]. Since this is a highly specialized
DApp, it is unclear how the methodology described can
be applied to general scientific research data sharing
settings nor how the researchers and participants would
be incentivized to use the DApp.
To address the data management challenges
pertaining to protocol compliance, patient enrollment,
transparency, traceability, data integrity, and selective
reporting in clinical trial management, a solution
that combines blockchain and a decentralized file
management system called Inter-Planetary File System
(IPFS) is discussed in [34]. The main focus of this
system is consent management, which is only one side
of the equation, and they lack an incentive mechanism
that would drive broad-scale adoption.
As electronic health records are increasingly utilized
in medical research, a blockchain-based framework
with fine-grained access control in which an authorized
researcher can search and gain access to the data is
introduced in [35]. This system, too, lacks a description
of scalable incentives that may ultimately decide the
success or the failure of the DApp.
There is also a fair-sized list of startups and
organizations attempting to increase data-sharing or
data-use via blockchain. The Ocean Protocol [36] is a
market built on Ethereum [37] that allows for the sale,
consumption, and stake of data. The organization has
a native token called OCEAN, an ERC20 token [38],
which can be used for the purchase or stake of a data
asset. The market provides data scientists a simple
platform to “list” datasets. When a dataset is added,
a new ERC20 token is minted for the dataset, known
as a “Datatoken.” To access the dataset, one must
own 1.0 of the Datatokens. The dataset, for the most
part, is never stored on-chain (on the blockchain). The
market, instead, provides theoretical “on and off-ramps”
to the data sets. Thus, the interoperable tokens can be
sent from wallet to wallet and exchanges without the
data ever leaving the hands of the original owner. The
use of smart contracts allows for different parameters
of agreement when one purchases a Datatoken (access
to a dataset). There are multiple types, but the two
prominent types, “time-bounded access,” which allows
for a certain period of access, and “compute-to-data,”
an on-site computation of data with a provided model
or algorithm, can be very attractive in incentivizing data
sharing. Although a data marketplace is different from
our goal of an ecosystem, we have taken several ideas
from the Ocean Protocol. One of the most important
aspects in DApps is to create tokens, which represent
access to stored datasets instead of storing large datasets
on-chain. Decentralized Machine Learning (DML) [39]
builds on the idea of “compute-to-data” implemented by
the OCEAN protocol, which allows data receivers to run
algorithms on datasets remotely without ever receiving
the data. In many cases, data contributors would
typically much rather do this than share their entire
dataset and this approach could be key in increasing
participation in our data ecosystem.
4. Application Capabilities
4.1. Smart Contract Powered Autonomous
Data Use Agreements
We propose a mechanism to capture the data life
cycle with smart contracts. A research study’s design
directly influences how a study’s data is collected
and recorded, including associated metadata that can
assert data context and ownership. We provide the
details for standards needed in developing solutions
that will preserve the study’s data and metadata
integrity, including a protocol facilitated by blockchain
technology for data sharing. This methodology will
facilitate proper data stewardship, including long-term
care in a sustainable way that enables data to be
discovered and reused for downstream investigations,
either alone or in combination with newly generated
data. It will improve the chance that the data will
generate correct new insights into new frontiers in
scientific research and reduce the number of avoidable
questions that the original researcher might have
to answer from other researchers about the data.
Researchers will be clear about the allowed and
disallowed usages of the data that is already shared.
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Data agreements encoded in the smart contracts will
handle several facets, as discussed below.
Providing Context: When people reuse data that have
been made available to them through the DApp, they
typically must understand the work required to create
those data and the greater insight into the context of
those data that their originators had. This process
enables them to acknowledge the debt to those original
data creators properly and better understand the data and
methods, and thus better enables them to use the data
appropriately. If the data reusers cite their sources, as
they would for print publications, it adds credibility to
the data used. If they do not cite data sources, then,
as in print media, they may be guilty of plagiarism.
We facilitate the requirement for capturing context
through the use of nanopublications [40] along with
computable provenance that can be directly ingested in
smart contracts.
Consolidating Scientific Research Data: There
are many data repositories in specialist data centers
managed by funding agencies, journals, and institutions
from all over the world [41]. We believe a uniform
data-use agreement methodology will help to make
these rich scientific research data sources appear more
unified and accessible. To achieve this objective,
we integrate the data access and reuse on disparate
data sources using smart contracts on the Ethereum
blockchain [37]. The utilization of Ethereum would
further enable the widespread adoption of DApp for
scientific research, similar to the revolution it has had
in the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) space where one
could build more complex financial products using a
“money lego” architecture [42]. Following a similar
methodology, we will create a class of smart contracts
that enable researchers to build “science legos” using
research artifacts shared with them.
Handling Legal Aspects: Copyright issues are
not very likely to compromise data publication and
dissemination extensively, because facts and short
statements are not copyrightable, although some names
and phrases may be trademarked. Thus, data can be
routinely extracted from various sources with terms and
conditions without infringing copyright through manual
or automated means. Furthermore, smart contracts
provide a mechanism for an exact representation of the
terms and conditions of data sharing and repurposing,
which is not subject to interpretation as in the traditional
data use agreements.
4.2. Incentive Engineering
The main problem in data availability is not a lack
of policy, technology, financial resources, or publication
outlets, but rather, the reward system has not kept pace
with the new technological opportunities [7]. Trying
to get the incentives right is not merely a matter of
looking at the monetary incentives. There are different
types of non-monetary incentives for those contributing
to science and different over-arching incentives for the
various stakeholder groups. The quest for knowledge,
findings that add to humanity’s understanding of the
world and ourselves, is what drives and inspires most
researchers. Traditionally academic science is not a
widely lucrative endeavor for most involved. But the
excitement of discovery and having rare or unique
knowledge of the world, coupled with the contribution
to the advancement of knowledge, and getting credit
for said contributions, are some of the non-monetary
incentives researchers have. There is also an increasing
shift towards highlighting individual contributorship,
as opposed to authorship in research, to help identify
influential individual researchers [43]. That will also
improve our ability to identify the right group of
researchers needed to advance research.
Similar to the idea of presenting a token in the
blockchain world, in the first half of 2012, the Center
for Open Science (COS) introduced “Open Science
Badges” for incentivizing open data sharing [44]. While
studies are unsure as to whether badges increase sharing
practices, the COS claims that badges increased the
reported open data rate at the journal from 1.5% to
39.4% over three years [45]. Therefore, a system of
badges or rankings based on the reputation index could
further increase the incentives to share reproducible
and well-annotated data. Our incentive methodology
through tokens would follow the same path, and we
expect to see similar results.
The h-index is a well-known metric used often
for hiring and grant decisions in academia. Since its
introduction by Hirsch in 2005 [46], the h-index
has turned the academic community into the
reputation-based economy we see today. Hood,
Sutherland has proposed “Data-index,” [47] which
is analogous to the h-index, but meant to measure
contributions of an individual as a data contributor
rather than as a data synthesist or paper author. The
Data-index is calculated similarly to the h-index, but the
set of papers it is calculated on differs because it uses
the cited shared datasets, which gives us a well-defined
metric that will differentiate between a data contributor
and a data synthesist.
Rewarding Reproducible Research: We are providing
a robust mechanism to report the data’s usefulness and
the research methods’ reproducibility. The usefulness
and reproducibility will improve the reputation of the
researcher or organization contributing the dataset in
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our incentive model, and thus have a higher reward.
Since we aim to build a data community consisting of
a network of researchers who share and use their data,
the incentives offered to the data community is to reuse
the research data of colleagues and others in a field of
common interest, with the goal of building upon one
another’s work, and possibly the commercial application
of that research that will have greater monetary benefits.
One standard metric of peer recognition is the citation
of papers. Citation also shows who is responsible
for the information cited and provides its authority,
an essential aspect of quality assessment. There is
a concern that datasets will not be cited in the same
way that print publications would be when they are
the source of information. This concern is justified,
as most online databases do not provide a citation for
each dataset like that of print media, and data users
tend to cite the website’s URL where the dataset is
found rather than the actual dataset and its authors
or editors, regardless of whether this information is
available. Such incorrect citation is equivalent to
authors’ citing a journal rather than the papers published
in that journal. Our DApp enables reporting of the
impact of scientific data at a granular level and the
reproducibility of the research methods through the use
of nanopublications [40], thus providing incentives to
researchers to supply well-annotated, highly reusable
data and reproducible methods, which will specifically
address the difficulty of attribution across multiple
cycles of research. This process has the potential to
revolutionize how data is cited and potentially create
a new kind of academic reputation index akin to the
h-index for data citation.
Rewarding Peer Verification: Researchers can
make mistakes either intentionally or unintentionally.
Consider the case of 31 retracted cardiology papers
that contained fabricated data and infected the literature
for more than a decade [48]. Scientists can also
unintentionally perpetuate bad results by merely running
an array of tests on a dataset until something interesting
or statistically significant shows up (commonly referred
to as p-hacking) [49]. If such bad research results
have been published, we need a mechanism to
enable interested parties to rapidly track, identify, and
appropriately amend every article that had referenced
the original bad result. However, more importantly, if
the falsified data was available, others could verify the
data and report any issues before the fraudulent results
are perpetuated. We believe that practices that improve
reproducibility will be more effective than a small
percent chance of receiving punishment for practices
that reduce reproducibility.
Handling “Researcher’s Dilemma”: We investigate
a quasi-optimal solution to the classic “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” [50] as it applies to scientific research data
sharing, which we will call the “Researcher’s Dilemma.”
Consider two researchers’ behavior deciding whether
to share materials or data (this use case is similar
to the Franklin vs. Watson and Crick story [11]
introduced in Section 2). If one scientist shares data,
the likelihood of the other scientist solving the problem
increases. Sharing has the potential benefit that the
other scientist may share their material in the future.
Both researchers would be better off if they shared,
but neither does so unless the situation is expected to
arise again and often. When the prospect of sharing
occurs repeatedly, the researchers weigh the current gain
from refusing to share against the expected loss from
the lack of access to materials or data in the future.
The best possible outcome is multilateral cooperation
among all the researchers. Since the researchers with
shorter time horizons will be less likely to share, their
incentives would be higher in the protocol for incentives.
If the environment is very competitive (i.e., multiple
researchers attempting to be the first in the field), the
reward incentives for the researchers who share the data
would be made higher. These game-theoretic aspects
are taken into account in the design of the ERC20 token
associated with the DApp.
5. Use Case
To illustrate the application capabilities described
in Section 4, we implemented a use case in a
scientific research area that has seen rapid interest
in data reuse recently. Data collected as part of
the COVID-19 National Collaboration (N3C) [51]
was an ideal candidate for this purpose. We
mainly investigated the data use agreements and the
contribution principles available on the N3C website,
which helped us build foundations for creating our
blockchain-based decentralized application. Through
the N3C research group notes, we learned more about
some real-world use cases that utilize COVID-19 data.
For example, the Immuno-Suppressed/Compromised
Clinical Domain Team researched the COVID-19
infection data to gain a better understanding of how
COVID-19 affects patient populations with suppressed
or compromised immune systems. This included what
kind of data researchers were exploring and what
application they built for solving a certain research
problem. The user agreement on N3C set several
limitations for the users applying for access to data. For
example, the data must be used for research purposes,
and the N3C sets different data levels for different
users. If the users want to get a more detailed and
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accurate dataset, there would be more restrictions and
requirements.
We analyzed five policies listed in Section 5.1 and
implemented them in smart contracts using solidity.
The code is available at https://github.com/
sharing-science/data-sharing-dapp.
5.1. Modeling N3C Data Sharing Policies
Figure 2. The Modeled N3C COVID-19 Data
Request Life Cycle
First, we created a checklist for how the N3C data
access committee, a governing body within the N3C that
evaluates data access requests, reviewed and approved
the data use requests. We also set two major policies
for violations, and users should not only agree to obey
the rules themselves, but they are also responsible for
reporting the violations from any of their collaborators
or a third party they share data with. Moreover, in
our smart contract implementation, we modeled how
the data access committee sets suspension to users,
collaborators, and third-party in a more detailed way
according to the timely report by users and verification
by the data access committee. As an example, Policy 1
we implemented using a smart contract states:
For each proposed Research Project,
User(s) agree(s) to submit a Data Use
Request to the Data Access Committee for
review and approval to access the Data.
To implement this policy, we utilize a combination
of eight functions described below.
1. CreateContract(): Create a new contract,
initiated by the data access committee by
changing the state from NotReady to
ReadyforRequirement.
2. RequireRequest(): Data access
committee’s request for the submission of
the request by the user, changing the state to
ReadyforSubmitRequest.
3. UserSubmitRequest(): Submit the request
to the data access committee with the change of
state to ReadyforReview.
4. Check isResearcher(): Check names of
project personnel before approving a request.
5. Check hasResearchStatement():
Check the non-confidential research statement.
6. Check hasProjectProposal(): Check
the project proposal contained in the request.
7. Check hasDataLevel(): Check if the user
has the required data access level.
8. The committee will review the request by
checking each requirement for a completed
request. If the checklist contains all correct
stated information, the request will be approved
using ApproveRequest(), in which case, the
contract will be active by changing to Active.
Otherwise, the request will be aborted under the
function, and then the contract will go through
selfdestruct().
The process of a successful data access request
implementing the above policy is depicted in Figure 2.
The user interface of the DApp given in Figure 3
presents the applicable policies to the user, and for this
first policy, they are requested to supplement the file
containing information about the request. As can be
seen in Figure 3, when the user first gets to the contract
page, the contract state is NotReady as displayed in the
upper right corner. The user can click on the Agree
button for the first policy and upload their data use
request. At this point, the contract state will change to
ReadyforReview. The data use request the user sent is
then routed to the data access committee, who verifies
the required information on their end, as demonstrated
in Figure 4. If the data access committee ascertains that
the user request contains all the required information,
the contract state will be changed to Active, and the user
gets the permission to the requested Data Set.
5.2. Incentivizing Data Sharing and Reuse
We propose an ERC20 [38] token implementation
for “data credits,” which users receive upon verification
and exchange for data. By minting a token and
supplying verified users with the given token, we create
a theoretical marketplace by which transactions occur.
Upon registration and verification, participants receive
an initial set amount to use. We have implemented
a two-step transaction for this process. The first step
is a transaction between the sharer and receiver–a set
amount, either static or set by the sharer when they
list their dataset. The second step involves a set of
confirmations by other participants in the community.
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Figure 3. Data Sharing Contracts Available to the User
Figure 4. Data Access Committee Granting Permission After Verifying the Data Access Request Proposal
Many of our data use policies we reviewed (introduced
in Section 5.1) call for a third party to confirm proposals
and the use of datasets. We define this third party
as any given set of other participants in the DApp.
When a transaction is presented, others in the system
are notified of it and receive information about the
proposal and requested use. If they choose to participate,
they approve or deny the proposal, and for this, we
can reward them with “data credits.” This assumes
that most of the community participating is honest
and fair and wants to uphold the integrity of their
community. Once the transaction receives a certain
number of confirmations, the transaction is approved,
and data is shared.
We have implemented a proof of concept ERC20
token to implement the “data credits.” This contract acts
as a mint for the tokens and holds a mapping to users’
accounts to store information about participants. It acts
as a factory by which it creates a new smart-contract
instance of “Account.sol.” The factory then allows us
to look up different information about a user using just
their linked Ethereum address. It also manages the
transfers of data through a function. After verifying
the transaction, it sends the ERC20 token from the
data recipient’s account to the data sharers token. It
further handles confirmations by sending new tokens to
confirmers’ accounts as they participate. The second
contract handles single instances of a user. It allows
us to store data on-chain about the user, such as their
name, the amount of data they have shared or received,
and their “data credit” balance. It will also handle the
updating of the Data-index.
6. Conclusion
Our contributions are built on blockchain
technologies, primarily smart contracts to implement
a decentralized application methodology and a
novel incentive mechanism for data sharing. We
demonstrate the value of our approach by implementing
a proof-of-concept decentralized application for
scientific researchers to contribute high-quality data in
academic and industrial research workflows. However,
this methodology is not limited to research data sharing.
A key innovative aspect of this work is the departure
from the traditional data use agreements to make
them more computable, resulting in improved data
availability for the broader scientific community. Our
application also provides a mechanism for capturing
the contribution and intellectual property details of
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research data in a trackable and virtually immutable
way. Through this research, digital data objects of
many kinds may become “first-class” citizens and are
not relegated to optional supplementary material. We
demonstrate this in the setting of collecting, sharing,
and reusing scientific data.
The future outlook of our research includes the
possibility to enhance data sharing environments
to move from self-reporting websites (e.g.,
projectreporter.nih.gov and clinicaltrials.gov), and
other scientific data repositories (e.g., Genbank [52])
to smart contract enabled automatic query, delivery,
and compliance checking. Our research could also
create computable data management plans that facilitate
scientific data, code, and methodological procedures
to be shared in data management plans in a Findable,
Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable (FAIR)
manner [4].
Using a fully autonomous process to capture
the data life cycle, we will improve how data
is collected and give more value to the overall
effort undertaken in the experimental data creation
and collection process through subsequent reuses
of the data. With lower barriers to data access
and the preservation of provenance in the setting
of publications, under-represented researchers from
resource-poor institutions will have better access to
quality data, improving science equity and the overall
data access to do impactful work. Similarly, in the
setting of enterprise data, data contributors who may not
be favored or connected in portions of the enterprise may
have their data more broadly recognized and reused,
thus potentially helping underserved minorities. Our
research would also facilitate a more fine-grained and
transparent system for data contributors for receiving
credit, potentially addressing current problems with
credit allocation for data generation.
In conclusion, this research aims to improve
scientific data practices (collection, sharing, and reuse)
to develop better data-informed products in a shorter
period that will benefit society. By providing a
robust end-to-end data infrastructure to researchers, we
reduce the time it takes to bring a scientific innovation
from bench to bedside, allowing innovations to reach
vulnerable populations that would greatly benefit from
faster miracles. While we focused on scientific data
sharing, which often happens through the scientific
process, we believe nothing about our approach is
limited to scientific settings. A similar approach
could be implemented in an in-house enterprise,
access-controlled setting. With the realization and
large-scale adoption of the work outlined in this paper,
data creators worldwide, who are not just in scientific
research settings but also many other domains, would
contribute their data, receive kudos, and discover new
related datasets seamlessly and accountably.
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